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INTRODUCTION
The most familiar doctrine in administrative law is Chevron deference:
when Congress leaves an ambiguous gap in a piece of legislation, the regulations
that fill it "are given controlling weight unless they are arbitrary, capricious, or
manifestly contrary to the statute."' Less well known is the deference that ap-
plies to agencies' interpretations of their own regulations. This doctrine, known
alternately as Auer deference or Seminole Rock deference,2 gives an agency's in-
terpretation "controlling weight unless it is plainly erroneous or inconsistent
with the regulation." 3 Auer is important. For now, the doctrine still sits in Chev-
ron's shadow, but it presents issues that, in the words of Chief Justice Roberts,
go "to the heart of administrative law" and "arise as a matter of course on a
regular basis."
4
The future of Auer is also in doubt. In a series of important critiques (most
notably John Manning's influential article on the subject 5) commentators have
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1. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984).
2. I follow the Court's recent convention and refer to this doctrine as Auer deference
throughout. But the terms are used interchangeably. See, e.g., Kevin M. Stack, In-
terpreting Regulations, 111 MICH. L. REV. 355, 371 (2012) (noting that the doctrine is
"referred to as Seminole Rock deference and Auer deference").
3. Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410, 414 (1945).
4. Decker v. Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr., 133 S. Ct. 1326, 1339 (2013) (Roberts, C.J., concur-
ring).
5. See John F. Manning, Constitutional Structure and Judicial Deference to Agency In-
terpretations of Agency Rules, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 612 (1996). One might expect
Manning's views to have particular influence with Scalia because Manning served
as one of the Justice's first clerks. See Two New Faculty Are Appointed at Columbia
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chipped away at Auer's foundations-foundations that once seemed both stur-
dy and obvious. A particularly prominent concern is that Auer generates bad
incentives: by giving administrators a broad mandate to interpret their own
regulations, and by combining the legislative and interpretive powers in a single
body, Auer gives agencies a reason to produce vague regulations.6 (Why struggle
for precision in the present, when future interpretations will still receive courte-
ous treatment from the courts?) This vagueness, in turn, imposes costs (like un-
certainty and surprise) on regulated entities and others who interact with the
administrative state.
These concerns have started to stir interest with the Supreme Court. Last
term, in Decker v. Northwest Environmental Defense Center-a decision applying
and upholding Auer-Chief justice Roberts wrote a concurrence (joined by Jus-
tice Alito) that expressed willingness to revisit the doctrine when the issue is ful-
ly briefed.7 Justice Scalia, in turn, wrote a long partial dissent that expressed no
such patience ("[e]nough is enough"'). He advocated scrapping Auer then and
there, a call to arms that was all the more notable because Scalia himself had
written the unanimous Auer opinion sixteen years earlier. Scalia's Decker dissent
was probably the most sustained judicial attack on the doctrine9 (though not
Scalia's first'") and the circuit courts have taken note." Over the past year, a
morbid consensus has emerged: Auer isn't long for American law.'2
Law, COLUM. UNIV. REC. (Oct. 21, 1994), http://www.columbia.edu/cu/record/
archives/vol2o/vo12oiss7/record2oo7.19.html.
6. An important caveat is in order: this is not to suggest that the incentive problem is
the only critique of Auer. Other issues, like compatibility with the separation of
powers or the Administrative Procedure Act, have been raised. I limit my discus-
sion to the incentive issue for two reasons. First, the other issues have been taken
up at length elsewhere in the recent literature. See, e.g., Aneil Kovvali, Note, Semi-
nole Rock and the Separation of Powers, 36 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 849 (2013).
Second, the separation of powers question often blurs into the consequentialist
incentives question: in other words, a key reason that critics dislike giving agencies
legislative and interpretive power is that it creates bad incentives. But it is less
clear whether Auer violates some preexisting doctrinal constitutional constraint.
7. Decker, 133 S. Ct. at 1338 (Roberts, C.J., concurring).
8. Id. at 1339 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
9. John Elwood, Opinion Analysis: Too Soon to Say "Au Revoir" to Auer?,
SCOTUSBLOG (Mar. 22, 2013, 1:o9 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2o13/o3/
opinion-analysis-too-soon-to-say-au-revoir-to-auer ("Decker represents the most
extensive challenge to Auer yet, with Justice Scalia offering the most detailed judi-
cial exposition ... of reasons to abandon that rule.").
1o. See Talk Am., Inc. v. Mich. Bell Tel. Co., 131 S. Ct. 2254, 2266 (2011) (Scalia, J.,
concurring) (arguing that Auer "frustrates the notice and predictability purposes
of rulemaking, and promotes arbitrary government," and noting that he "will be
receptive" to reconsidering Auer when the question arises).
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Auer's critics have perceptively exposed the doctrine's flaws. But it is un-
clear whether the call for a wholesale abandonment of the doctrine is warrant-
ed. A comparative consideration-is Auer really worse than the alternatives?-
is especially valuable because, for the first time at the Court, Scalia's Decker dis-
sent sketched a vision of what might take the doctrine's place. Scalia wrote that
he would prefer to "resolve these cases by using the familiar tools of textual in-
terpretation to decide: [what is] proscribed by the fairest reading of the regula-
tions?"' 3-a position that seems to go beyond what Manning himself has advo-
cated and what other commentators commonly suggest should replace Auer.'
4
(Perhaps unsurprisingly, Scalia's dissent contained no reference to Skidmore v.
Swift, the pre-Chevron case that famously accorded an agency's interpretation
only the "power to persuade"-a doctrine that is often thought of as the default
deference regime when Chevron does not apply, 5 and of which Scalia has been a
particularly vociferous critic. 6 )
This paper concedes that Auer is a flawed doctrine, but argues that Scalia's
alternative (or Skidmore) may well be the greater evil. Indeed, while the argu-
ments of Scalia, Manning, and others have done a powerful job of exposing Au-
er's flaws, the counterarguments have not been adequately aired-
counterarguments crucial to clearheaded thinking about the development of
11. See, e.g., Kolbe v. BAC Home Loans Servicing, LP, 738 F.3d 432, 453 (ist Cir. 2013)
(noting Scalia's recent skepticism and stressing that "Auer deference is not neces-
sary to our conclusion").
12. See, e.g., Case Note, Clean Water Act - Auer Deference - Decker v. Northwest Envi-
ronmental Defense Center, 127 HARV. L. REV. 328, 333 (2013) ("It seems that Auer's
days may be numbered.").
13. Decker v. Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr., 133 S. Ct. 1326, 1342 (2013) (Scalia, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part).
14. See Manning, supra note 5, at 618 (suggesting that "courts should evaluate agency
interpretations of regulations under the standard of judicial review prescribed by
Skidmore"); see also Brief for Law Professors as Amici Curiae on the Propriety of
Administrative Deference in Support of Respondent, Decker v. Nw. Envtl. Def.
Ctr., 133 S. Ct. 1326 (2013) (Nos. 11-338, 11-347), 2012 WL 5361523 (calling for limita-
tions to Auer but not its elimination).
15. See Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944) ("The weight of [an adminis-
trator's] judgment in a particular case will depend upon the thoroughness evident
in its consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and
later pronouncements, and all those factors which give it power to persuade, if
lacking power to control."); see also William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Lauren E. Baer, The
Continuum of Deference: Supreme Court Treatment of Agency Statutory Interpreta-
tions from Chevron to Hamdan, 96 GEO. L.J. 1083, 1109 (2008) (discussing the
modern role of Skidmore).
16. See, e.g., Christensen v. Harris Cnty., 529 U.S. 576, 589 (2000) (Scalia, J., concur-
ring in part and concurring in judgment) ("Skidmore deference to authoritative
agency views is an anachronism, dating from an era in which we declined to give
agency interpretations ... authoritative effect.").
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this doctrine. (And it is undoubtedly a doctrine that will develop further. Nu-
merous cases concerning the scope of Auer are winding their way through the
federal courts. And, later this term, the Supreme Court will hear a case that will
map one of Auer's borders: the justices will clarify the circumstances under
which an agency's interpretation must go through notice-and-comment proce-
dures.")
Ultimately, this area of law requires negotiating two classic concerns of the
modern administrative state: accommodating the need for agency flexibility
while guarding against the specter of what Justice Jackson memorably described
as "administrative authoritarianism"-the "power to decide without law.""
There are, of course, many potential doctrines that might strike the right bal-
ance (if balance is indeed what we want). '9 Nonetheless, this paper makes two
relatively narrow claims. First, I argue that the evolution of the current Auer
doctrine already represents a plausible strategy for negotiating between exper-
tise and authoritarianism. Indeed, while Auer's "plainly erroneous" standard
continues to set the doctrine's baseline, Auer's "domain" is increasingly limited
by a series of important carve-outs--carve-outs that "tailor deference to varie-
ty,"2 just as United States v. Mead limits Chevron.' In other words, Auer has a
step zero-it is not a one-size-fits-all approach-a recent doctrinal shift that
has gone unnoticed." Second, in light of the fact that Auer has evolved, Scalia's
alternative (the wholesale abandonment of the doctrine) seems particularly ex-
treme. It does not adequately appreciate the costs of transition or the full range
of incentive effects that dismantling Auer would entail. Indeed, Scalia's alterna-
tive might not live up to the most heavily advertised virtue of dismantling Auer:
improving regulatory clarity and avoiding unfair surprise. In short, Auer is the
devil we know-and may be the devil worth keeping.
17. See Mortg. Bankers Ass'n v. Harris, 72o F.3d 966 (D.C. Cir. 2013), cert. granted, 134
S. Ct. 2820 (2014).
18. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 216 (1947).
19. See, e.g. Kevin 0. Leske, Between Seminole Rock and a Hard Place: A New Ap-
proach to Agency Deference, 46 CONN. L. REV. 227, 227 (2013) (promoting a "two-
step test to determine whether to defer to an agency's interpretation of its regula-
tion"); Case Note, supra note 12 (arguing for limitations on Auer based on a "one-
bite" principle).
20. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 236 (2001).
21. See infra Part I.
22. Q. Matthew C. Stephenson & Miri Pogoriler, Seminole Rock's Domain, 79 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 1449, 1483 (2011) ("Perhaps surprisingly, less attention has been
paid to the fact that agency interpretations of regulations may also appear in a
wide variety of forms."). While Stephenson and Pogoriler lament the lack of at-
tention paid to the variety of administrative interpretations, their article was pub-
lished before the most important doctrinal developments that are attentive to this
variety. See infra Part II.
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I. SEMINOLE ROCK, AUER, AND THEIR CRITICS
The Administrative Procedure Act (APA) contains fairly detailed proce-
dures that agencies must follow in order to promulgate formal and informal
rules.23 Formal rulemaking is used on the rare occasions that a statute requires
that rules "be made on the record after opportunity for an agency hearing."2
4
Informal rulemaking is more common, and requires that agencies comply with
assorted requirements for providing notice and an opportunity to comment
(hence, "notice-and-comment"). But the APA contains no requirements for
how detailed or precise the final rules themselves must be, reflecting a general
preference for agency flexibility that received the imprimatur of the Supreme
Court in the 1947 case of SEC v. Chenery Corp." Or, as the Court put it more re-
cently: "[tihe APA does not require that all the specific applications of a rule
evolve by further, more precise rules rather than by adjudication. "2" The stand-
ard justification for this preference is flatly practical. It would be burdensome if
agencies needed to promulgate new formal rules to cover each new and unan-
ticipated case in which the original rule might apply. That explanation seems
sensible enough, but it raises the potential for conflict: when a party interacting
with an agency believes it has complied with a regulation, but the agency inter-
prets otherwise.
Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., decided in 1945, was the first Supreme
Court case to deal with such a conflict. Three years before the decision, at the
height of the Second World War, the Office of Price Administration issued
price-control regulations requiring (in somewhat circuitous language) that the
maximum price for an article "delivered or offered for delivery" in March of
1942 would be the highest price "charged" during the same month." (These
wartime regulations were designed to prevent large month-to-month jumps in
price: the idea was that the price of goods delivered in the present would set a
ceiling for goods delivered in the future.) Seminole Rock, which sold crushed
stone, had an October 1941 contract to deliver its product at sixty cents a ton in
23. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-59 (2012); see also DANIEL T. SHEDD, CONG. RESEARCH SERV.,
R43153, SEMINOLE ROCK DEFERENCE: COURT TREATMENT OF AGENCY
INTERPRETATION OF AMBIGUOUS REGULATIONS 2 (2013) (discussing the relationship
between Auer and the rulemaking process).
24. 5 U.S.C § 553(c) (2012).
25. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 202 (1947) ("The function of
filling in the interstices of the Act should be performed, as much as possible,
through this quasi-legislative promulgation of rules to be applied in the future.
But any rigid requirement to that effect would make the administrative process
inflexible and incapable of dealing with many of the specialized problems which
arise.").
26. Shalala v. Guernsey Mem'l Hosp., 514 U.S. 87, 96 (1995).
27. Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410, 414 (1945).
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March of 1942.' When the company made new contracts several months later
to sell its product at higher rates, the administrator brought an action to enjoin
the sale, arguing that the new contracts violated the price controls. The admin-
istrator claimed that the maximum price was fixed by mere delivery in 1942.
The company, on the other hand, argued that a price was fixed only when there
was both delivery and charge in the decisive month.29
The plain text of the regulation-with its clumsy tangle of charges, deliver-
ies, and offers for delivery-did not suggest an obvious answer. But the Su-
preme Court sided with the Price Administration, holding that "the ultimate
criterion" in interpreting the regulation was "the administrative interpretation,
which becomes of controlling weight unless it is plainly erroneous or incon-
sistent with the regulation."3
Intriguingly, the Seminole Rock Court cited no authority of any kind for this
standard. But, over time, various practical and legal rationales have emerged to
justify the deference. For a long time, a popular justification was a kind of a
warped originalist rationale: a current agency interpretation offers the greatest
insight into the intended meaning of the originally promulgated rule." But this
justification seemed to ignore the fact that rule and interpretation are often sep-
arated by the passage of time, professional turnovers, and political elections.32
And it is a justification that rests, moreover, on the contestable notion that
courts should look to what the original regulator meant.33
By the end of the century, the justification had evolved. When the Court re-
affirmed Seminole Rock in the 1997 case of Auer v. Robbins, the rationale for
such broad deference had shifted to the familiar territory of comparative insti-
tutional competence-"broad deference is all the more warranted when" the
programs in question "require significant expertise and entail the exercise of
judgment grounded in policy concerns" 34-coupled with a seemingly intuitive
inference about the logical reach of Chevron. In Auer, the Court considered
whether the Department of Labor's overtime regulations, which did not cover
28. Id. at 412.
29. Id. at 415.
30. Id. at 414.
31. See Stephenson & Pogoriler, supra note 22, at 1454.
32. Indeed, this early rationale for Seminole Rock deference might actually have a kind
of anti-originalist quality, since it suggests that an after-the-fact agency gets to fix
the so-called original meaning, rather than be bound by it.
33. See Decker v. Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr., 133 S. Ct. 1326, 1340 (2013) (Scalia, J., concur-
ring in part and dissenting in part) ("The implied premise of this argument-that
what we are looking for is the agency's intent in adopting the rule-is false. There
is true of regulations what is true of statutes. As Justice Holmes put it: '[w]e do
not inquire what the legislature meant; we ask only what the statute means."') (in-
ternal citations omitted).
34. Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala, 512 U.S. 504, 512 (1994).
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workers paid on a salary (as opposed to hourly) basis, applied to St. Louis police
sergeants and lieutenants who earned salaries that could be reduced based on
the "quality or quantity" of work completed.35 The Secretary of Labor argued
that the officers were not entitled to overtime pay; Scalia, writing for a unani-
mous Court, agreed. "A rule requiring the Secretary to construe his own regula-
tions narrowly would make little sense," Scalia wrote, "since he is free to write
the regulations as broadly as he wishes, subject only to the limits imposed by the
statute. " 36 In other words, the ruling in Auer could be thought of as a simple,
logical extension of Chevron. Scalia found it ridiculous to take with one hand
what the Court had given with the other.
But Auer differs from Chevron in one crucial respect: while Chevron divides
the power to legislate and interpret between Congress and an agency, Auer
seems to hand both powers to the agency-arguably violating the familiar max-
im that no one should be a judge in her own case. 37 In theory, Chevron gives
Congress an incentive to (in Scalia's words) "speak as clearly as possible on the
matters it regards as important."' The clearer Congress speaks, the less power
agencies have to pursue contrary objectives. Auer, on the other hand, gives
agencies an incentive to (in the words of one influential critic) be "vague in
framing regulations, with the plan of issuing 'interpretations' to create the in-
tended new law without observance of notice-and-comment procedures."
39
Indeed, as that quote suggests, Auer seems additionally worrying because it
cuts a path that agencies might use to skirt an important legal constraint. In
general, when agencies act to make binding instantiations of law, they must
comply with either ex ante procedural safeguards or live with a more scrutiniz-
ing version of ex post judicial review. (This is sometimes called the "pay now or
pay later" principle.40 ) For example, when implementing a vague statute, agen-
cies might choose between more costly notice-and-comment rulemaking
(which will usually get Chevron deference) or less costly informal interpreta-
35. Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 454-55 (1997).
36. Id. at 463.
37. Stephenson & Pogoriler, supra note 22, at 146o. But see Adrian Vermeule, Contra
Nemo Iudex in Sua Causa: The Limits of Impartiality, 122 YALE L.J. 384, 387 (2012)
("Sometimes rulemakers in public law do and should design institutions with a
view to the nemo iudex principle. In other cases, however, they do not and should
not. In many settings, public law makes officials or institutions the judges of their
own prerogatives, power, or legal authority. Officials or institutions may deter-
mine their own membership, award their own compensation, rule on the limits of
their own jurisdiction, or adjudicate and punish violations of rules they them-
selves have created.").
38. Decker, 133 S. Ct. at 1341 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
39. Robert A. Anthony, The Supreme Court and the APA: Sometimes They Just Don't
Get It, 1o ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 1, 11-12 (1996).
40. For a much fuller discussion of these points, see Stephenson & Pogoriler, supra
note 22, at 1461-65.
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tions of the statute (which will get only Skidmore deference).41Auer threatens
this bargain by suggesting a method for skipping the bill: agencies can comply
with the barest ex ante formal procedures-say, by using notice-and-comment
to promulgate a mushy legislative rule that simply restates the ambiguous text
of the statute-but still give the rule bite with later interpretations that have no
procedural safeguards and receive little judicial scrutiny.
II. THE NEED FOR BALANCE-AND DOCTRINAL MOVES TOWARD IT
Manning's and Scalia's criticisms should not be exaggerated: agencies are
not necessarily mechanical cost minimizers or power maximizers, 4 and they
still churn out plenty of precise, detailed rules.43 But these criticisms nonetheless
have an attractive logical force: allowing agencies wide latitude to interpret their
ambiguous regulations does seem to provide those agencies with little incentive
to make their regulations more precise.
But precision is not the only value that agency actions must serve-and,
indeed, more precision is not always better. As Colin Diver pointed out more
than 30 years ago, there are often unavoidable tradeoffs between, on the one
hand, the transparency and accessibility of a rule, and the rule's "congruence"
with underlying policy objectives on the other." (For example, a rule mandat-
ing that no pilot fly after his fiftieth birthday might be easy to understand and
apply. But, like many bright-line rules, it will push out many safe pilots and
keep in many unsafe pilots, and it won't necessarily maximize safety.45) In the
context of Auer deference-as in many other areas of administrative law-the
goals with which precision competes are the expertise and flexibility of the
agency. Auer, unsurprisingly, favors flexibility and expertise.
46
41. See id. at 1463.
42. Indeed, the agencies' maximand turns out to be a tricky thing to model. For clas-
sic but somewhat diverse examples, see WILLIAM A. NISKANEN, JR., BUREAUCRACY
AND REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT (1971), which uses a model in which agencies
seek to maximize their budgets; and Richard A. Posner, The Behavior of Adminis-
trative Agencies, i J. LEGAL STUD. 305, 305 (1972), which uses a model in which
agencies are assumed to maximize the utility of their law-enforcement activities.
43. See Stephenson & Pogoriler, supra note 22 at 1465 (noting that "under the current
regime, agencies still engage in substantial legislative rulemaking, and these rules
are often quite detailed").
44. See Colin S. Diver, The Optimal Precision of Administrative Rules, 93 YALE L.J. 65
(1983).
45. Id. at 67-71. Note that this is also a subcategory of the general efficiency tradeoff
between rules and standards. See Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Eco-
nomic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557 (1992).
46. See e.g., Case Note, supra note 12, at 333 (arguing that Auer "respects comparative
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Are there ways to respect institutional competence while also avoiding the
worst of agency incentives? In an important sense, doctrinal developments since
Auer-and especially since Scalia's Decker dissent-have attempted to strike
this balance by mapping the boundaries of deference with more precision.
Soon after Auer, the D.C. Circuit started to map this boundary when it con-
sidered whether regulations promulgated under the Americans with Disabilities
Act required that stadium owners offer their wheelchair-bound patrons lines of
sight over standing spectators.4 1 (The plaintiffs' concern was that spectators
would stand and cheer during the most dramatic moments, depriving disabled
fans of their view when it matters most.) The text of the regulation in question
demanded only "lines of sight comparable to those for members of the general
public." ' The D.C. Circuit panel did not hesitate approving the Department of
Justice's interpretation-publicized several years earlier in ADA assistance
manuals-that "comparable" lines of sight required a view over standing spec-
tators.49 Nonetheless, Judge Silberman's majority opinion went out of its way
(with an approving nod to Manning's article) to suggest "an outer limit" to the
Auer doctrine: "[a] substantive regulation must have sufficient content and de-
finitiveness as to be a meaningful exercise in agency lawmaking."5 "It is certain-
ly not open to an agency to promulgate mush," Silberman concluded, "and
then give it concrete form only through subsequent less formal 'interpreta-
tions."'5'
Silberman's musings had the flavor of dicta, but sharper doctrinal limits
have since followed. In a series of decisions that are reminiscent of Chevron's
first step,52 for example, the Court has made clear that "Auer deference is war-
ranted only when the language of the regulation is ambiguous,"5 3 just as Chev-
ron deference is warranted only when the language of the statute is ambiguous.
At first blush, this might appear to be a simple restatement of why Auer offers
bad incentives (wouldn't this be more likely to produce unclear regulations?),
but this version of the doctrine does genuinely restrict the domain of Auer.
54
47. Paralyzed Veterans of Am. v. D.C. Arena L.P., 117 F.3d 579, 580 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
48. Id. at 581.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 584.
51. Id.
52. Chevron's first step is deciding whether the statute in question is ambiguous (or,
put differently, whether Congress has spoken to the issue).
53. Christensen v. Harris Cnty., 529 U.S. 576, 588 (2000).
54. To see why, consider two possible descriptions of Auer deference: (i) "A court will
always defer to an agency's interpretation of a regulation"; and, (2) "A court will
always defer to an agency's interpretation of a regulation when the regulation is
ambiguous." Depending on how one conceives of the agency's maximand, it's not
obvious that (2) will produce worse "clarity" incentives than (1). But (2) will re-
strict an agency's interpretation in cases where it is attempting to change the regu-
183
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More recently, the Court has made clear that the regulation in question cannot
simply "parrot[ I" the language of the underlying statute, fleshing out the upper
bound of regulatory vagueness.
55
This was perhaps best seen in Gonzales v. Oregon, in which the Court con-
sidered whether the Attorney General could interpret regulations to criminalize
prescribing drugs for assisted suicide. The relevant regulations required that
drug prescriptions shall be issued "for a legitimate medical purpose by an indi-
vidual practitioner acting in the usual course of his professional practice." 6 The
regulation did seem genuinely vague; certainly, nothing about the language sug-
gested that it would be "plainly erroneous" to exclude assisted suicide from the
category of legitimate medical practices exercised in the usual course of care.
But the problem was that the language of the regulation was almost identical to
the language of the underlying statute, which defined a "valid prescription" as
one "issued for a legitimate medical purpose."5 7 According to Justice Kennedy's
majority opinion, this knocked the regulation outside the domain of Auer:
"[a]n agency does not acquire special authority to interpret its own words
when, instead of using its expertise and experience to formulate a regulation, it
has elected merely to paraphrase the statutory language." 8 Kennedy's so-called
"antiparroting canon" 59 thus made the case turn on the meaning of the statute,
not the regulation. (The Court held that the regulation was not entitled to
Chevron deference, and that the statute did not authorize the Attorney General's
actions.)
In addition, the Court has consistently held that the interpretation in ques-
tion cannot be a mere "post hoc rationalization"-language that was used in
Auer but taken up in other cases6 -or a simple "convenient litigating posi-
tion."6' In Chase Bank v. McCoy, for example, the Court had to decide whether
regulations issued under the Truth in Lending Act required credit-card issuers
to notify cardholders of an interest rate increase that, under the contract's
terms, was triggered by the cardholder's delinquency or default. Once again, the
Court held that the regulation in question was indeed ambiguous6: it required
lation of a previous administration or has simply changed its own mind - that is,
in cases where the regulation is clear through no fault of the agency's present-day
interpreters.
55. Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 256-57 (2006).
56. Id. at 256.
57. Id. at 257.
58. Id.
59. This term, since widely used, was coined in Scalia's dissent. See id. at 278 (Scalia,
J., dissenting).
60. See Chase Bank USA, N.A. v. McCoy, 131 S. Ct. 871, 873 (2011).
61. Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 213 (1988).
62. See Chase Bank, 131 S. Ct. at 878.
184
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simultaneously that issuers disclose "each periodic rate that may be used to
compute the finance charge"6 (which would seem to cover the contract terms)
but exempted notice requirements for rate increases that followed from "the
consumer's default or delinquency 6 4 (which would seem to exclude them). The
Court deferred to the interpretation offered by the agency-in this case, the
Federal Reserve Board's view that notice was not required-even though the
Board's interpretation was offered (like the interpretation in Auer) only in an
amicus brief before the Court.6" But the Chase Bank majority also took great
pains to emphasize why deference was warranted-and, in so doing, offered
more details on when it would not be. Perhaps most intriguingly, the Court
suggested that the interpretation was deference-worthy in part because the
agency was "not a party to this case."66 While the Court did not elaborate, the
implication seemed to be that an agency's simultaneous involvement in litiga-
tion and interpretation-easy-to-identify factors-would be a combination of
perverse incentives too rich for the Court.
The Court introduced its most recent influential carve-out in 2012, in
Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp. Like Auer, Christopher involved the
overtime requirements of the Fair Labor Standards Act. According to the Act,
overtime requirements do not apply to a company's "outside salesman," a term
defined by a complex (and, yes, ambiguous) series of Department of Labor reg-
ulations.6" Two salesmen employed by the pharmaceutical company SmithKline
Beecham (now GlaxoSmithKline) sued for overtime pay in Arizona federal
court, which dismissed the suit. (The district court held that plaintiffs "plainly
and unmistakably fit within the terms and spirit" of the outside salesmen ex-
emption.8) While the case was being appealed, however, the Department of
Labor filed an amicus brief in separate litigation in the Second Circuit-to
which the Second Circuit deferred 69-offering an interpretation of the regula-
tions that supported the Arizona salesmen's claim. But the Ninth Circuit de-




65. Id. at 88o.
66. Id. at 881 ("The Board is not a party to this case.... In short, there is no reason to
suspect that the position the Board takes in its amicus brief reflects anything other
than the agency's fair and considered judgment as to what the regulation required
at the time this dispute arose.").
67. Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 132 S. Ct. 2156, 2161 (2012).
68. Christopher v. SmithKlein Beecham Corp., No. CV-o8-1498, 2009 WL 4051075, at
*4 (D. Ariz. Nov. 20, 2009).
69. In re Novartis Wage & Hour Litig., 611 F.3d 141 (2d Cir. 201o), abrogated by Chris-
topher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 132 S. Ct. 2156 (2012).
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The Supreme Court agreed with the Ninth Circuit and declined to defer to
the agency interpretation. Writing for the majority, Alito confessed that Auer
"ordinarily calls for deference to an agency's interpretation of its own ambigu-
ous regulation, even when that interpretation is advanced in a legal brief'7 -- as
it was in both Auer and in the case before the Court. But Alito went on to hold
that, in the present pharmaceutical case, there were "strong reasons for with-
holding the deference that Auer generally requires," because agreeing with the
agency interpretation would "impose potentially massive liability on respond-
ent for conduct that occurred well before that interpretation was announced."
7'
Such liability would, Alito cautioned, amount to the kind of "unfair surprise"
that the Court had warned against almost five years earlier in Long Island Care
v. Coke.72
Since Christopher, the circuit courts have also developed other limits to Au-
er's reach, deciding cases that both shore up the holding in Christopher73 and
suggest new limits to the Auer doctrine. Last year, the Fifth Circuit reviewed a
decision of the Department of Health and Human Services to uphold fines lev-
ied against a nursing home for undercooking eggs. (The investigating agency
had observed two breakfast plates "smeared" with egg yolk,74 apparently sug-
gesting undercooking violations severe enough to warrant a $5,000 fine.) The
regulations in question mandated only that facilities serve food in a "sanitary"
manner,75 a requirement that left a hefty portion to the imagination. Long be-
fore the litigation, however, the department had issued an interpretive manual
that offered more specific guidance, suggesting that eggs should be cooked at
"145 degrees F for 15 seconds; until the white is completely set and the yolk is
congealed." 76 The problem was that this interpretation was also vague. Indeed,
the case hinged on a crucial semicolon; since the punctuation could be read ei-
70. Christopher, 132 S. Ct. at 2166.
71. Id. at 2167.
72. Id.; see also Long Island Care at Home, Ltd. v. Coke, 551 U.S. 158, 170-171 (2007);
Theodore J. Boutrous, Jr. & Blaine H. Evanson, The Enduring and Universal Prin-
ciple of "Fair Notice," 86 S. CAL. L. REV. 193, 194 (2013) (describing the Christopher
decisions as an example of a more general fair notice requirement, which the au-
thors describe as an "essential protection of the due process clause, [which]
shields all defendants from unfair and arbitrary punishment").
73. See, e.g., Sun Capital Partners III, LP v. New England Teamsters & Trucking In-
dus. Pension Fund, 724 F.3d 129, 140 (ast Cir. 2013) ("The letter is not owed Auer
deference in this case because such deference is inappropriate where significant
monetary liability would be imposed on a party for conduct that took place at a
time when that party lacked fair notice of the interpretation at issue.").
74. Elgin Nursing & Rehab. Ctr. v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 718 F.3d 488,
490 (5th Cir. 2013).
75. Id.
76. Id. at 494.
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ther conjunctively or disjunctively, it wasn't clear what should happen if an egg
was cooked for 15 seconds at 145 degrees but remained stubbornly runny.
The nursing home insisted that its cooking-which supposedly met the
timing and heat requirements-passed muster. The agency disagreed: it insisted
that the eggs had to be cooked solid. But the Fifth Circuit declined to grant the
agency's interpretation deference, noting that all of the circuit's previous Auer
decisions "addressed only an agency's direct interpretation of its published reg-
ulations." 7 In this case, the court continued, the agency "asks us to go a step
further," in search of what the opinion memorably described as "Seminole Rock
squared" deference-"deferring to its interpretation of its manual interpreting
its interpretive regulation." 78 The court (with an approving nod to Christopher)
declined to defer to this epiphenomenal interpretation, arguing that to hold
otherwise would burden the courts with additional litigation and deny regulat-
ed entities fair notice about what a regulation entailed.
79
The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, meanwhile, has recently de-
clined to grant Auer deference to new agency interpretations that conflict with
previous or longstanding ones"° (as have the Ninth Circuit' and the Eighth Cir-
cuit2). The Federal Circuit considered whether a colonel from the Oregon na-
tional guard, "automatically retired" after 20 years of service, was "eligible" (in
the words of the military memorandum at issue) for a hearing before a reten-
tion board. The court actually resolved the case at what might be called Auer
step ones3 -the memo was held to be not ambiguous and the retired colonel
was indeed eligible for a hearing-but nonetheless pressed on to observe that,
"[e]ven if the regulation was ambiguous, the deference traditionally given to an
agency's interpretation would not be warranted here. 's4 This was because the
agency offered numerous interpretations (the court counts at least four) and
"each newly posited rationale differed from the earlier-provided rationales.""s
"The inconsistencies and series of different rationales," the court concluded,
77. Id. at 493.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 494.
80. Cameron v. United States, 550 F. App'x 867, 874 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
81. Indep. Training & Apprenticeship Program v. California Dep't of Indus. Rela-
tions, 730 F.3d 1024, 1035 (9th Cir. 2013) (noting the presence of two concerns:
"the DOL's interpretation is inconsistent with its prior interpretation, and there is
a significant potential for unfair surprise").
82. Perez v. Loren Cook Co., 75o F.3d 1oo6, 1017 (8th Cir. 2014) ("When an agency
acquiesces in an interpretation of an ambiguous regulation for an extended period
of time, then changes its interpretation to sanction conduct that occurred prior to
the new interpretation, 'there are strong reasons' for withholding deference.").
83. See supra note 52.
84. Cameron, 55o F. App'x at 874 (emphasis added).
85. Id.
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"provide a further reason why the interpretation ... advanced by the govern-
ment in this appeal does not merit the traditional level of deference."86
That same year, the Tenth Circuit questioned whether Auer applies to novel
interpretations, period.8" Abercrombie & Fitch had appealed a summary judg-
ment in favor of an Equal Employment Opportunity Commission claim that
the clothing company failed to provide a reasonable religious accommodation
for a potential employee (a young Muslim woman who wore a headscarf) in vi-
olation of Title VII. s The Tenth Circuit reversed the district court and rejected
the EEOC's claim, holding that the potential employee had not satisfied an im-
portant element of the prima facie case: she had not provided the hiring agent
with notice of the necessary accommodation. In emphasizing this element of
the prima facie case, the court rejected the EEOC's push for a "broader" inter-
pretation of the notice requirement, one in which the employee would not be
the only permissible source of notice. (In this case, the Muslim woman's friend
had informed employees of the same Abercrombie branch that she wore a head-
scarf.) In denying the EEOC Auer deference, 9 the court mentioned many of the
same factors cited in the cases above-surprise, conflict with other interpreta-
tions-but concluded with what might be the most ambitious suggestion for
the limits of Auer deference: "the EEOC does not identify any prior instance
where it has taken the stance regarding notice that it does here, and its position
does not appear to be anything other than a creature of this proceeding"-a
proceeding where it was (in the words of Chase Bank) "a party to this case." 90
This is ambitious reasoning partly because Auer itself blessed creatures of a pro-
ceeding: there, Scalia rejected the petitioner's complaint that that interpretation
arrived "in the form of a legal brief."91 More broadly, it suggests the long logical
reach of the "fair notice" and "unfair surprise" themes: agencies should not ex-
pect Auer deference for interpretations that parties had no reason to expect.
A bit of summary is in order. Seminole Rock and Auer established a simple
baseline standard: "the administrative interpretation.., becomes of controlling
86. Id.
87. EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., 731 F.3d 11o6, 1139 (ioth Cir. 2013) ("In
other words, on prior occasions, the EEOC has repeatedly taken a position on the
notice question that is inconsistent, and conflicts with, the interpretation of that
question that it now seeks to engraft onto its regulation.").
88. Id. at 1o-11.
89. For the purposes of this short paper, I bracket the question of whether the EEOC
might be an outlier in the Court's deference jurisprudence. See, e.g., EEOC v. Ara-
bian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 256-57 (1991) (noting that the EEOC is not typical-
ly entitled to Chevron deference). In any case, the potentially special status of the
EEOC does not appear to have been a factor in the Tenth Circuit discussion of
Auer in the Abercrombie case.
90. Abercrombie, 731 F.3d at 1139.
91. Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 462 (1997).
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weight unless it is plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation." 92 That
standard has now been tempered in a number of ways. First, the Court has
made clear that Auer deference is warranted only when the regulation in ques-
tion is actually ambiguous.93 Second, the regulation can't be too ambiguous: it
can't, for example, parrot the ambiguity of the statute.9 4 Third (and itself
somewhat ambiguously), the interpretation must be the agency's considered
judgment; it can't be simple after-the-fact convenience.9 Fourth, the interpreta-
tion cannot impose too much unexpected liability.96 Fifth, in at least one circuit
the interpretation cannot be interpreting a preexisting interpretation.97 Sixth, in
several circuits the interpretation cannot conflict with previous interpreta-
tions.98 Seventh (and perhaps halfway to eighth), at least one circuit has af-
firmatively suggested that an interpretation is less worthy of Auer deference
when it is novel, and when the agency is a party to the case. 99
There are family resemblances between these limits. (Interpretations that
conflict with longstanding ones might be more likely to occasion an unfair sur-
prise; interpretations offered by an agency that is a party to litigation might be
less likely to reflect the agency's considered judgment; and so on.) But many of
these doctrinal innovations do to Auer what United States v. Mead does to Chev-
ron: they limit the "domain" of deference by adding what is often described as a
"step zero."' °
92. Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410, 414 (1943).
93. Christensen v. Harris Cnty., 529 U.S. 576, 588 (2000).
94. Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 256-57 (20o6).
95. See Chase Bank USA, N.A. v. McCoy, 131 S. Ct. 871, 873 (2011); Bowen v.
Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 213 (1988).
96. Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 132 S. Ct. 2156, 2167 (2012).
97. Id.
98. See Perez v. Loren Cook Co., 750 F.3d loo6, lOO6-14 (8th Cir. 2014); Cameron v.
United States, 55o F. App'x 867, 874 (Fed. Cir. 2013); Indep. Training & Appren-
ticeship Program v. Cal. Dep't of Indus. Relations, 730 F.3d 1024, 1035 (9th Cir.
2013).
99. See EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., 731 F.3d 1106, 1139 (loth Cir. 2013).
Whether or not an agency is party to the case has been discussed in previous deci-
sions. But, to the best of my knowledge, this is the only case in which the fact that
the agency is a party is affirmatively weighed as a factor against deference.
loo. See Stephenson & Pogoriler, supra note 22, at 1452; cj. Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin
E. Hickman, Chevron's Domain, 89 GEO. L.J. 833 (2001) (making a similar argu-
ment in the Chevron context). For a longer discussion of the step-zero concept in
the Chevron context, see generally Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 92 VA. L.
REV. 187 (2006).
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Mead was not the first case to limit Chevron deference in this way,'"' but it
was almost certainly the most important. In Mead, the paper and school-supply
company challenged a tariff ruling letter-essentially, a short customs classifica-
tion ruling-that re-categorized Mead's day planners as "diaries" and subjected
them to higher tariff rates.' °2 The company lost in the administrative appeals
process, but the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed, holding that
the letter was not entitled to Chevron deference. The Supreme Court affirmed,
holding that Chevron applies "only when it appears that Congress delegated au-
thority to the agency generally to make rules carrying the force of law, and that
the agency interpretation claiming deference was promulgated in the exercise of
that authority." "Delegation of such authority," Justice Souter continued, "may
be shown in a variety of ways,"'0 3 including whether the agency had the power
to engage in notice-and-comment rulemaking;' 4 whether the agency action in
question applied generally and prospectively or only between the parties; °5 and
the sheer volume of rulings produced.' 6
Auer now has a step zero. For at least a decade, the doctrine has had an im-
plicit step one: before the Court asks whether the agency's interpretation is
plainly erroneous, it asks whether the regulation in question is actually ambigu-
ous. (Just as, in the Chevron context, courts ask whether a statute is ambigu-
ous.'0 7) In addition, previous authors have certainly advocated new constraints
on Auer that resemble Mead's constraints on Chevron. 8 But the fact that con-
temporary Auer doctrine is starting to "tailor deference to variety" is an im-
ioi. See Sunstein, supra note ioo, at 211 (describing Christensen as the "initial" deci-
sion).
102. See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 225 (2001).
103. Id. at 226-27.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 233 ("Customs has regarded a classification as conclusive only as between
itself and the importer to whom it was issued.
1o6. Id. ("Any suggestion that rulings intended to have the force of law are being
churned out at a rate of io,ooo a year at an agency's 46 scattered offices is simply
self-refuting.").
107. It's worth noting that the coherence of these discrete steps is often disputed. See,
e.g., Matthew C. Stephenson & Adrian Vermeule, Chevron Has Only One Step, 95
VA. L. REV. 597 (2009) (making the argument suggested by its title). I'm sympa-
thetic to Stephenson and Vermeule's account, but I'm also uncertain of the stakes
in the debate: counting steps in Chevron might be a little like counting angels on
the head of a pin. I adopt the "steps" terminology because it is a useful and widely
used shorthand for making the analogy between developments in Auer and devel-
opments in Chevron.
1o8. Stephenson & Pogoriler, supra note 22, at 1452 (considering "the question of
whether there ought to be limits to Seminole Rock's domain, comparable. . . to the
limits that have been advocated.. . for Chevron's domain").
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portant and underappreciated feature of current law. (A recent casebook, for
example, notes that "there is no equivalent in [the Auer] setting to the Meadl
step zero line of cases,"' 9 and as recently as last year-even in the wake of
Christopher-critics were still lamenting "the one-size-fits-all approach now
embodied in Auer.""0 ) Three years ago, Matthew Stephenson and Miri Po-
goriler asked whether American law might "conclude that although it is usually
sensible to presume that a congressional delegation to an agency... implicitly
includes a delegation of the power to issue definitive interpretations of those
rules, this presumption is appropriate only when these interpretations are is-
sued in certain forms, but not others."' At the time they conceded that "the
current caselaw does not appear to endorse any such principle.""2 Increasingly,
however, the caselaw does exactly that.
III. SCALIA'S UNEASY CASE AGAINST AUER DEFERENCE
In a sense, then, the Auer doctrine is evolving to heal itself. The doctrine
now consists of a default standard ("controlling weight unless it is plainly erro-
neous or inconsistent with the regulation") tempered by a series of limitations
and carve-outs that seem increasingly Mead-like. Viewed in this light, the doc-
trine has a more nuanced and pragmatic spirit than its most unsparing critics
suggest.
Of course, that pragmatic spirit does not, in the words of Stephenson and
Pogoriler, "lead inexorably to any particular conclusions regarding the proper
scope" of Auer deference" 3-just as pragmatic rationales for Chevron deference
do not, a priori, resolve hard questions about the proper deference owed to tar-
iff letters. The question is always relative: what's the best way to strike the
pragmatic balance?
That question is frustrating to answer in the abstract. But there are good
reasons to think Scalia's option-or, as is more commonly suggested, reverting
to Skidmore deference-is not as obvious as he would like to suggest. For one,
it's not clear that Scalia's solution will succeed by one of its own standards: re-
ducing regulatory uncertainty and the risk of "unfair surprise." This is partly for
a reason that Scalia identifies in his Decker dissent: without Auer, the country
will face "the uncertainty produced by divergent views of numerous district
courts and courts of appeals as to what is the fairest reading of the regulation,
1O9. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND REGULATORY POLICY: PROBLEMS, TEXTS, AND CASES 384
(Stephen G. Breyer et al., eds., 7th ed. 2011).
no. Daniel Mensher, With Friends Like These: The Trouble with Auer Deference, 43
ENVTL. L. 849, 871 (2013).
Ill. Stephenson & Pogoriler, supra note 22, at 1484.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 1458.
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until a definitive answer is finally provided, years later, by this Court.'1 4 That
process can surely produce surprises of its own."'
But the problems run deeper. The Auer debate focuses almost exclusively
on agency incentives vis-A-vis regulatory precision, ignoring the fact that aban-
doning Auer might have broader, cross-cutting incentive effects. These come in
several forms. First, removing Auer may make rulemaking costlier, in the sense
that more front-end rulemaking effort will be required on the part of the agency
to produce its desired outcomes in individual cases. (Auer lets the agencies delay
the development of specificity, and presumably the development of specificity is
costly.) This might lead to fewer regulations, slower regulations, or shift the bal-
ance away from rulemaking and toward adjudication (which would, in turn,
vitiate the public benefits of the notice-and-comment process)." 6
Removing Auer might also affect the incentives of regulated parties them-
selves: at least one commentator has argued that Auer gives regulated entities
better incentives to participate early in notice-and-comment than Skidmore,
since regulated entities are currently more likely to succeed in a hard-look chal-
lenge than a challenge under Auer. The thought is that, if Auer gives agencies an
incentive to skimp on notice-and-comment-to parrot the statute, to promul-
gate mush-it presumably gives regulated entities a complementary incentive to
join the fray early. Under Skidmore, by contrast, regulated entities will be less
eager to bring concerns to an agency's attention, thinking that they are more
likely to succeed in challenging the agency's subsequent interpretation." 7 Both
of these ideas can be expressed with a little more formality: for regulated enti-
ties, Auer raises the cost of skipping notice-and-comment; Skidmore lowers the
cost of skipping notice-and-comment." Whether the switch from Auer to
Skidmore (or to Scalia's "fairest reading" standard) will reduce or increase the
114. Decker v. Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr., 133 S. Ct. 1326, 1341 (2013) (Scalia, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part).
115. There are different views as to whether circuit splits are common or problematic.
Of particular note might be Chief Justice Roberts's argument that easily accessible
online legal databases have made circuit splits less common. See Robert Barnes,
Roberts Supports Court's Shrinking Docket, WASH. POST, Feb. 2, 2007, http://www
.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/o2/ol/AR2o07020102213.html.
But Roberts's claim turns out to be extremely hard to test empirically. See Aaron-
Andrew P. Bruhl, Following Lower-Court Precedent, 81 U. CHI. L. REV. 851, 904-9
(2014) (describing various difficulties with measuring circuit splits).
116. For a similar set of points, see Manning, supra note 5, at 693.
117. Scott H. Angstreich, Shoring Up Chevron: A Defense of Seminole Rock Deference
to Agency Regulatory Interpretations, 34 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 49, 117-18 (2000).
118. It seems plausible that participation in notice- and-comment might also help an
entity's ex post judicial challenge, but I know of no data on or detailed discussions
of this topic.
33 :175 2014
THE UNEASY CASE AGAINST AUER AND SEMINOLE ROCK
total uncertainty of regulations is mired in uncertainty of its own. (This is a fact
to which Manning seems more attuned than Scalia. '" 9)
This uncertainty is related to a second concern about abandoning Auer and
Seminole Rock: the longstanding reliance interests. Part of the fear with Auer is
that it lets agencies surprise regulated entities: the interviewer at Abercrombie
won't know what the EEOC demands; the pharmaceutical company won't
know what to pay its "salesmen." But regulated entities might be more uncer-
tain about dismantling the doctrine-and casting doubt on many thousands of
longstanding agency interpretations. This concern seems especially noteworthy
because the notice and reliance concerns of regulated entities seem like the great
themes of recent developments in the Auer doctrine. And, more generally, it's
worth noting that these reliance interests are stronger here than in most other
areas of administrative law: because Seminole Rock--decided in 1945-preceded
the APA, every agency interpretation of a legislative rule was presumably of-
fered in an era when both agencies and regulated entities thought of those in-
terpretations as controlling.
These heightened reliance interests may also help explain a puzzling asym-
metry between Auer and other areas of administrative law. Two recent com-
mentators-otherwise convinced that there are good pragmatic justifications
for Auer-observe that the general policy justification ("agencies need flexibil-
ity") seems sound, but confess that they can "think of no reason why this justi-
fication for deference is more powerful in the context of agency interpretations
of agency rules" than in other contexts, like agency policy decisions or agency
findings of fact.'2° The implication is this: sure, agencies need flexibility, but
why do they need more flexibility when interpreting regulations than when
finding facts? One potential answer is that regulated entities need to rely on
agency interpretations-"will this apply to me in the future?"-in a manner
that does not apply to an agency's case-specific factual findings.
The longstanding nature of Auer deference connects with a final concern
about abandoning the doctrine: like Chevron, it can also be thought of as a clear,
stable background rule for Congress. It is sometimes argued slyly that Auer and
Chevron create "opposite incentives""': Chevron prods Congress to write clear
statutes; Auer tempts agencies to write vague regulations. What this ignores is
that the clarity of statutes also affects Auer's reach. Chevron puts the burden on
Congress: if Congress doesn't like the agency's regulations, it can write a clearer
119. Manning, supra note 5, at 691 ("The shift away from Seminole Rock... entails
some uncertainty.").
120. Richard J. Pierce & Joshua Weiss, An Empirical Study of Judicial Review of Agency
Interpretations of Agency Rules, 63 ADMIN. L. REV. 515, 517 (2011).
121. Case Note, supra note 12, at 332; see also Decker v. Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr., 133 S. Ct.
1326, 1341 (2013) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("While the
implication of an agency power to clarify the statute is reasonable enough, there is
surely no congressional implication that the agency can resolve ambiguities in its
own regulations.").
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statute. But Auer can be thought of in similar terms: if Congress is concerned
about the agency's one-two punch of vague regulation and surprising interpre-
tation, it can also rectify the matter by writing a clearer statute. In that sense,
Auer, like Chevron, offers what Scalia once described as "a background rule of
law against which Congress can legislate, '.22 which is preferable to judicial case-
by-case considerations that create (in Scalia's words) "a font of uncertainty and
litigation." '123
Of course, it is unsurprising that Scalia would not favor a Mead-like doc-
trine in the Auer context. (To wit, Scalia on Mead: "[i]ts consequences will be
enormous, and almost uniformly bad."'24 ) But Scalia's change of heart nonethe-
less seems sudden and dramatic: he dissented sharply in Gonzales v. Oregon, re-
proaching Kennedy's "antiparroting" logic and defending "our unanimous de-
cision in Auer," which made clear that "broadly drawn regulations are entitled
to no less respect than narrow ones." '25 As recently as 2011, Scalia joined the
Court's unanimous opinion upholding and applying Auer in Chase Bank."6
What explains his shift? One theory is that the Court has has started apply-
ing Mead's controversial flexible deference regime in the previously uncontro-
versial Auer context. In this regard, it is interesting to consider Souter's descrip-
tion of his disagreement with Scalia in his Mead majority opinion:
If the primary objective is to simplify the judicial process of giving or
withholding deference, then the diversity of statutes authorizing discre-
tionary administrative action must be declared irrelevant or mini-
mized. If, on the other hand, it is simply implausible that Congress in-
tended such a broad range of statutory authority to produce only two
varieties of administrative action, demanding either Chevron deference
or none at all, then the breadth of the spectrum of possible agency ac-
tion must be taken into account."7
"Justice Scalia's first priority over the years has been to limit and simplify,"
Souter concluded. "The Court's choice has been to tailor deference to varie-
ty. 128 One could imagine the same being said about the debate over Auer. The
Court's gradual development of the Auer doctrine into a Mead-like tailored def-
erence regime may help explain why Scalia would be so quick to sweep away
Auer's once simple rule in favor of case-by-case "fairest readings." And if that's
right, then it's the debate over Mead, not Auer, that matters most.
122. Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law, 1989
DUKE L.J. 511, 517.
123. Id. at 516.
124. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 261 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
125. Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 277 (2006) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
126. See Chase Bank USA, N.A. v. McCoy, 562 U.S. 195 (2011).
127. Mead, 533 U.S. at 236-37.
128. Id.
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Mead is not an object of universal affection. For some, it has created chaos
and muddle in the lower courts. 29 For more sympathetic commentators, some
kind of judicial effort to limit the scope of Chevron is desirable. 3 ° But the debate
over Mead's utility is unlikely to be settled soon: in a sense, it may simply con-
stitute one instance of the longstanding contrast between the ex post flexibility
of standards and the ex ante clarity of rules.
But, in this regard, there is one important difference between the worlds of
Mead and Auer. Critics of Mead crave the clarity of a strong Chevron presump-
tion; critics of Auer want either Skidmore or Scalia's alternative. Those latter al-
ternatives are hardly invitations to clarity-as Scalia might know better than
anyone else. Elsewhere, he has described Skidmore as "a recipe for uncertainty,
unpredictability, and endless litigation." "To condemn a vast body of agency
action to that regime," he wrote, "is irresponsible."'3 Condemning Auer to the
ash heap might be equally irresponsible, and fearing that fate does not require
overlooking Auer's faults. The doctrine is a compromise: better than the alter-
natives, but-to borrow from Scalia once more-"not without its warts.
''32
129. See Lisa Schultz Bressman, How Mead Has Muddled judicial Review of Agency Ac-
tion, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1443 (2005); Adrian Vermeule, Mead in the Trenches, 71
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 347 (2003).
130. See Merrill & Hickman, supra note loo, at 837 ("We argue that the presumption in
favor of Chevron deference should be subject to rebuttal based on the totality of
the statutory circumstances.").
131. Mead, 533 U.S. at 250 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
132. Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CINN. L. REV. 849, 856 (1988).
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